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o countries with poor investor protection actu-
ally suffer? This is the ultimate question posed
by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(henceforth LLSV, 1998) in their seminal paper on
law and finance. Subsequent research provides
important insight into the significance of investor
protection, but the evidence on whether countries
with poor investor protection actually suffer is
mixed.1 On the one hand, several studies link poor
investor protection to adverse outcomes such as
more severe agency costs, sub-optimal investment
behavior,higher costs of capital,and smaller and less
developed financial markets.An example of a typical
argument on this side of the debate is put forth by
LLSV (1998). In essence, countries with poor
investor protection have smaller debt and equity
markets (LLSV, 1997), and poor financial develop-
ment is related to lower economic growth (King and
Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; and Rajan
and Zingales, 1998). Taken together, LLSV (1998)
argue that this evidence describes a link from the
legal system to economic development.
On the other hand,countries like Germany and Italy
both had a higher per capita GDP than the United
Kingdom in the 1990s even though both had much
weaker investor protection (EIU Country Data). In
addition, results in some recent papers suggest that
poor investor protection does impact a country, but
adverse outcomes may be mitigated. These studies
suggest that individual firms are able to take mea-
sures to improve the quality of protection for their
investors, and markets respond favorably to such
efforts.2 Moreover, Rajan and Zingales (2003) con-
sider a much longer time period than LLSV (1997)
and find that patterns of financial development
throughout the 20th century cannot be explained by
time-invariant factors, such as a country’s legal ori-
gin. Thus, the results in this second group of papers
cast doubt on the extent to which countries with
poor investor protection suffer.
The apparent lack of consensus on the extent to
which countries with poor investor protection suffer
may stem from the almost exclusive focus of existing
research on domestic firms. Extending analyses to
consider cross-border “real” investment (i.e., foreign
ownership and control of domestic assets) by multi-
nationals may ease this tension. Taken as a whole,
cross-border investment can contribute significantly
to a country’s economic development. For example,
FDI stock equaled around 36 percent of
Switzerland’s GDP in 2000 (UNCTAD, FDI/TNC
database). In a recent study for the International
Monetary Fund, Prasad et al. (2003) report that of
the studies surveyed on the relation between types
of capital flows and economic growth, FDI is one
form of capital inflows that tends to be positively
associated with both domestic investment and
domestic growth in a relatively consistent manner.
Recognizing the relation between a country’s
investor protection environment and globalization,
or real investment in a country by multinational
firms,could therefore produce a richer picture of the
implications of poor investor protection. For exam-
ple, LLSV (1998) find that the risk of expropriation
is greater in countries with poor investor protection.
From this perspective, multinationals may limit real
investment in countries with poor investor protec-
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tion because the costs of doing business are much
higher. If poor investor protection deters both capi-
tal investment in domestic companies and real
investment by foreign multinationals,a stronger case
can be made for countries with poor investor protec-
tion suffering.
Paradoxically, the vast literature on multinational
activity suggests that costs to domestic firms associ-
ated with poor investor protection may actually
encourage real investment by foreign multinationals.
Extant literature on multinational activity suggests
that multinational activity is more likely when com-
petition is imperfect, because imperfect competition
allows for differentiation and greater comparative
advantages for multinationals.3 When poor investor
protection hinders domestic competition,real invest-
ment by foreign multinationals might be greater.
Thus, domestic firm activity may be lower in coun-
tries with poor investor protection, but increased
foreign multinational activity might fill the void.
Take GM Europe as an example.According to USA
Today, GM Europe had become Europe’s No. 2 car
company in 1992.While European auto plants were
renowned for union strife, high costs, and outmoded
work methods, GM’s European headquarters in
Switzerland and Germany – both weak investor pro-
tection countries – was setting new standards for
efficiency. In fact, GM’s worldwide purchasing boss
is said to have worked miracles among GM’s
European suppliers by helping them modernize
operations, improve efficiency, and cut costs
(Maynard, USA Today, 1992). This relation would
suggest that countries with poor investor protection
may have a different mix of who supplies capital and
contributes to development, but they may not be at
a disadvantage or suffer.
Potential Sources of Comparative Advantages
Poor Shareholder Protection: Financing
Constraints versus Agency Costs
The models developed by Lombardo and Pagano
(2000) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2002)
suggest that poor investor protection results in con-
strained or more costly access to capital. Consistent
with this view, LLSV (1997) and Love (2003) find
that financing constraints are significantly greater in
nations with inadequate protection for investors. In
addition, Brockman and Chung (2003) examine the
Hong Kong equity markets and conclude that poor
shareholder protection decreases liquidity and ulti-
mately increases firms’ costs of capital.
The results in these papers suggest that profitable
projects may be unexploited by domestic firms in
countries with weaker shareholder protection
because access to capital is more constrained or cost-
ly. The  shareholder financing hypothesis predicts
foreign multinationals with greater access to capital
at a lower cost would then have a comparative
advantage and invest more in countries with weak
shareholder protection.
Existing literature also suggests that the discretionary
nature of investment is greater when shareholder pro-
tection is poor. For example, studies find that firms in
weak shareholder protection countries tend to pay
out less in dividends, hold excess cash, and manage
earnings more aggressively (LLSV, 2000; Dittmar et
al., 2003; and Leuz et al., 2003). The evidence of
greater discretion over investment in countries with
weak shareholder protection suggests that agency
problems are more severe, resulting in sub-optimal
investment decisions in these countries. Providing
support for this view,Wurgler (2000) finds firms tend
to overinvest in low growth industries and underin-
vest in high growth industries in weak investor pro-
tection environments. In addition, Rossi and Volpin
(2004) find that cross-border targets are typically
from countries with weaker shareholder protection
than the acquirers.The results in these papers suggest
firms in countries with poor shareholder protection
follow sub-optimal investment policies. The share-
holder agency hypothesis therefore predicts that for-
eign multinational firms will take advantage of
domestic firms’ sub-optimal investment behavior and
invest more when shareholder protection is weak.
Both the shareholder financing and agency hypo-
theses  predict a negative relation between share-
holder protection and foreign. multinational in-
vestment. However, the  shareholder financing
hypothesis predicts the comparative advantage for
multinationals associated with low shareholder
rights should be greater in industries with greater
dependence on external equity financing or in less
developed countries where financing constraints
may be more severe (Love, 2003; and Lins,
Strickland, and Zenner, 2005).
3 Dunning (1977, 1981) provides a useful framework for under-
standing multinational activity. Markusen (1995) provides a nice
discussion of both theoretical and empirical research on multina-
tionals.In contrast, agency problems are more likely to be
higher when financing constraints are lower. Jensen
(1986) argues that agency conflicts between manage-
ment and shareholders are higher for larger, estab-
lished firms generating large free cash flows avail-
able for discretionary spending. Moreover, less
reliance on external financing decreases market dis-
cipline so that agency problems are likely to be high-
er when dependence on external financing is lower
(Easterbrook, 1984). Consistent with this view, the
results in Durnev and Kim (2005) and Dittmar et al.
(2003) suggest that firms are less likely to establish
efficient governance systems and thus agency prob-
lems are more severe when external financing needs
are lower. Thus, the shareholder agency hypothesis
predicts a stronger negative relation between U.S.
multinational investment and shareholder rights in
industries with less dependence on external financ-
ing and in more developed countries.
Creditor Protection: Financing Constraints versus
Agency Costs
Existing studies indicate that access to debt may be
restricted when protection for creditors is poor. For
example, Giannetti (2003) finds that it is more diffi-
cult for unlisted firms investing in intangible assets
to obtain loans in countries with poor creditor pro-
tection. Djankov et al. (2004) find that the size of a
country’s private credit market is positively related
to the degree of protection it provides for creditors
and that access increases after creditor protection is
improved. Thus, the  creditor financing hypothesis
predicts that foreign multinationals with internal
capital markets will have larger comparative advan-
tages when creditor rights are low.
In contrast to strong shareholder protection,which is
associated with lower agency problems, strong cred-
itor protection may be associated with higher agency
problems.For example,managers’ incentives may be
more closely aligned with creditors than sharehold-
ers when creditors have strong rights. Smith and
Warner (1979) find that stronger protection for cred-
itors can prevent managers from making value-
increasing investment decisions. Instead, managers
may make decisions to decrease firm risk (e.g., hold
excess cash or invest to increase firm diversification
rather than shareholder wealth).Thus, in contrast to
the  creditor financing hypothesis, the  creditor
agency hypothesis predicts a foreign multinational
will have more opportunities to invest when creditor
rights are high.
Analysis of Multinational Investment and Investor
Protection
We surmise that if poor shareholder and creditor
protection hinders domestic firms’ abilities to raise
capital or poor shareholder protection facilitates
sub-optimal investment behavior (i.e., larger
agency problems), there may be opportunities left
by domestic firms that will be attractive to foreign
multinationals not operating under the same con-
straints. Under this scenario, domestic firm activity
may indeed be lower (or sub-optimal) in countries
with poor investor (shareholder) protection, but
increased foreign multinational activity might fill
this void.
We thus examine whether the investment patterns
of foreign multinationals with strong shareholder
protection and liberal access to financing suggest
comparative advantages relative to domestic firms
in countries with poor investor protection, once we
control for general differences that affect all firms.
In addition, we differentiate between domestic
firms’ agency problems and their constrained access
to external financing as sources of these compara-
tive advantages. Since U.S. multinationals are likely
to have relatively fewer financing constraints and
agency problems than local firms in many poor
investor protection nations, we focus on the invest-
ment patterns in their foreign affiliates to test our
hypotheses. International operations of U.S. multi-
nationals have continued to increase in importance
during the time period examined in most interna-
tional investor protection studies.According to the
U.S. Commerce Department, foreign profits of U.S.
firms grew at approximately twice the rate of
domestic profits for the same firms from 1982 to
1991 (Business Week, September 20, 1993).
Continuing an upward trend, investment by non-
bank U.S. multinational affiliates more than dou-
bled from 1994 to 2000 to $5,260 billion.This figure
represents 42 percent of U.S. parents’ total assets
(Mataloni and Fahim-Nader, 1996; Mataloni, 2002).
Analyzing investment in 41 countries,we document
that U.S. multinational investment is significantly
greater in both poor shareholder protection and
poor creditor protection countries. This relation,
unidentified in previous research, is an important
way in which adverse outcomes associated with
poor investor protection may be mitigated. For
example, Figure (right side) illustrates that U.S.
multinationals,on average,invested over $29 billion
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in countries with the weakest shareholder protec-
tion compared to an average of $7.5 billion for
countries with additional provisions in place to pro-
tect shareholders. The left side of the Figure pre-
sents a similar investment pattern when countries
are instead grouped according to the level of credi-
tor protection they provide. These relations are
robust to the inclusion of various other measures of
a country’s environment, including measures of
business environment and capital market develop-
ment. Additional analysis indicates comparative
advantages associated with poor shareholder pro-
tection primarily stem from more severe agency
problems in domestic firms. In particular, the rela-
tion with poor shareholder protection exists only in
developed countries, which are precisely the coun-
tries where financial constraints should be less
severe but agency costs should be more problemat-
ic.The relation with poor shareholder protection is
significant in emerging economies only when no
firm within a particular industry has accessed the
U.S. equity markets through cross-listing. Since
cross-listing may mitigate financing constraints, we
interpret this finding as evidence that,in certain sit-
uations, comparative advantages do stem from con-
strained access to external equity.
Overall,the shareholder protection results are consis-
tent with studies indicating that agency problems are
more severe, and thus investment decisions are sub-
optimal, in countries with poor shareholder protec-
tion (e.g.,Dittmar et al.,2003;Kuipers et al.,2004;and
Rossi and Volpin, 2004). The
result that U.S. multinational
investment is not related to poor
shareholder protection in emerg-
ing markets when domestic firms
cross-list in the U.S. is consistent
with domestic firms adapting to
poor investor protection environ-
ments to ease equity financing
constraints in certain situations
(e.g., Doidge et al., 2004; Durnev
and Kim, 2005; Klapper and
Love, 2004; and Reese and
Weisbach, 2002). The creditor
rights results are consistent with
domestic firms in poor creditor
protection countries having diffi-
culty obtaining debt financing
(see Giannetti, 2003) and U.S.
multinationals using their inter-
nal capital markets as a compara-
tive advantage over these domestic firms (see Desai
et al., 2004).
Do Countries with Poor Investor Protection
Suffer?
We find that poor protection of both shareholders
and creditors appears to attract foreign investment.
Thus, even though domestic firm activity may be
lower or sub-optimal in poor protection countries,
increased activity by foreign multinationals might fill
the void. Recognizing this relation is especially
important in light of the potential impact cross-bor-
der investment can have on a country’s economic
development. Whether increased foreign invest-
ment, combined with other mitigating factors, suffi-
ciently offsets the adverse effects of poor investor
protection is still an open question.However,the sig-
nificant relation between U.S. multinational invest-
ment and poor investor protection points to the
importance of recognizing cross-border investment
when considering this question.
We believe a fruitful area for future research
would be to consider specific avenues through
which foreign investment affects poor investor pro-
tection countries as more disaggregated data
becomes available covering longer time periods.
The differences between results for emerging and
developed economies suggest that the avenues
through which foreign investment affects poor
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Note to the Figure:
Average foreign investment, measured by the value invested in total assets of U.S. foreign subsidiaries,
is presented for each group of countries according to the level of creditor protection (left part) and
shareholder protection (right part). For creditor protection there are two levels, low or high (i.e. the
country provides creditors with 0 to 2 or 3 to 4 rights according to the LLSV creditor rights index).For
shareholder protection there are three levels, low, medium or high (i.e. the country provides share-
holders with 0 to 1, 2 to 4, or 5 rights according to the LLSV shareholder rights index).Two countries
are excluded from this figure to control for investment strongly influenced by cultural similarities.time with the level of economic development.
Further analysis of these issues can provide insight
into when real investment by foreign multination-
als can be a force behind functional convergence of
corporate governance in poor investor protection
environments.
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